Guns and Development

A recent Center for Global Development document, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role, by Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, provides an informative – and alarming – look at the Defense Department’s expanding role in the administration of U.S. foreign aid. As is now generally known, the Pentagon now accounts for over 20 percent of U.S. official development assistance (ODA) -- a total of $4.8 billion in 2005. DoD Directive 3000.5 (11/05) declares that the U.S. military would henceforth treat “Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” as a core mission. Together these raise concerns that U.S. foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short-term security agenda as defined by the Department of Defense.

A major DoD role in ODA – which should not be confused with poverty-focused development assistance -- is defensible in certain circumstances. The overwhelming bulk (62 percent) of DoD-administered ODA goes to Iraq and Afghanistan – countries where civilian agencies are severely restricted in their ability to operate. A draw-down in U.S. military involvement in these countries would almost certainly result in a corresponding reduction in DoD-administered ODA. Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, and disaster relief and reconstruction – both of which are included in ODA totals -- also call for Pentagon involvement.

This increased DoD role is understandable in light of the changed context for development efforts, with more countries now in conflict or post-conflict situations, or exhibiting characteristics of “fragility.” And the decline in capacity of USAID and the State Department have left a vacuum which the Pentagon is eager, for obvious operational reasons, to fill.   

It is the new and proposed DoD activities that should give rise to the most concern. These include on-going DoD-led activities in a number of African countries under various counter-terrorism initiatives. While the bulk of these have been military, over the past years civil affairs teams have also implemented hundreds of humanitarian and small-scale development projects – digging wells, repairing schools, and conducting medical and veterinary clines – all designed to eliminate the “root causes of terrorism.” These are frequently not coordinated with appropriate civilian authorities or with other US Government agencies, and raise concerns about the political message being sent, both in terms of the perceived “militarization” of foreign aid and the implied endorsement, irrespective of the views of the civilian (State and USAID) authorities, of governments seen by the Pentagon as “supportive” in the war on terror.

Beyond these activities, already on-going, the White House has recently asked Congress to expand the legislative authorities granted to the Pentagon to provide security assistance to partner nations in the global war on terrorism. The “Building Global Partnership Act” is designed to expand the DoD’s role as a direct provider of security assistance, in some cases making global or permanent the temporary authorities that DoD has enjoyed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Surprisingly, in light of the traditional Washington bureaucratic turf battles, the State Department has largely gone along with this usurpation of its authority over foreign relations. Fortunately, Congress has shown some skepticism.

The report offers several recommendations relevant for the future of foreign aid: adopting a strategic, integrated approach to fragile and war-torn states, clarifying agency roles and responsibilities in carrying out this agenda, and – most importantly -- providing civilian agencies with the tools they need to do the job. However, as long as USAID remains linked to the State Department – through “F” – and State remains (apparently) unwilling to contest the Pentagon for responsibility, Congress appears to provide the only hope for stopping and reversing the increasing role of the Defense Department in international development. 

Comments

[Eric Munoz]

You make several good points about the way in which the Pentagon's role in development - stability, security, transition and reconstruction projects - further complicates efforts to promote sustainable long-term development by traditional aid organs (e.g. USAID). Over at CGD Chris Blattman makes many of the same points - http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2007/11/africom_can_the_military_make_1.php - focusing on the Africom command center.

I would add just one other note to the long list of reasons why we should be concerned with DoD's role in development assistance: while far from absolute or perfectly respected, humanitarian workers are generally spared from being the target of attack because they are generally understood to be neutral actors in conflict situations. That statement needs plenty of qualification of course (aid has played a role in sustaining conflict and recent kidnappings of aid workers in Somalia and Sudan demonstrate that NGOs are targeted for attack). But the general neutrality of aid workers will come under increasing scrutiny the more that traditional development programs are undertaken by military actors (the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for example). Not only do DoD humanitarian/development programs further blur the lines between military and humanitarian intervention, but they may also put the lives of NGO workers at risk.